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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LORIN J. ELLISON, HARRY G. ANDERSON and WILLIAM A. DAWSON, doing
business as Famous Foods, a limited partnership, and BILL A. BAYES, administrator with the Will annexed of the estate of
Harry G. Anderson, deceased,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

No. 10550

- vs L.B. JOHNSON and LYMAN E. PASSEY,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover
money alleged to be due under a written contract
for the sale of the remaining term of a leasehold together with certain store equipment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court granted Judgment Sua Sponte on the
Pleadings and statement of counsel.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal and remand for trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The dispute before the court arises from the sale
by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the remaining
term of a lease on a store building, including fixtures
and inventory, located at 1322 East 2100 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.
The owners of the property, T. E. Robinson and
wife, had leased the land to the plaintiffs for a fifteenyear term by a lease, dated August 14, 1947 upon
the agreement of the Lessees to construct a store
building thereon. (R. 39-43). The plaintiffs sold their
leasehold interest to the defendant L.B. Johnson and
to his son Merrill Johnson. This sale was terminated
by an agreement dated November 1, 1955. It was
agreed by the parties that the amount due on the
L. B. Johnson-Merrill M. Johnson property lease
agreement was $39,650.92. See Exhibit 1.
The lease agreement sued on, Exhibit 1, was pr&
pared by plaintiff Lorin J. Ellison who represented
to the defendants that the monthly payments of $545
for 29 months and the monthly payments of $445 per
month thereafter would pay out the lease agre&
ment during the term of the Robinson lease. (R. 69).
The defendants paid each monthly payment until
April 1, 1963 (R. 11-15). Although the term of the Robinson lease expired on February 14, 1963, the d&
fendants held over until April, 1963, when they were
evicted. At the time the defendants were evicted the
remaining payments on the lease agreement
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amounted to $4778.35. The defendants refused to pay
after their eviction from the premises and Lliis suit
resulted.
The plaintiffs filed suit to recover the payments
which fell due after the eviction and the defendants
answered alleging mutual mistake and failure of consideration (R. 9-17). Plaintiffs' motion for summary
iudgment (R. 21) based on an interrogatory (R. 18)
was denied. The case was pre-tried (R. 28-30) and
was set for trial.
On the morning of the trial the court called a
conference of counsel in chambers, a transcript of
which is included in the record of this case. (R. 6475). After a short discussion of the case the trial judge
stated: "The plaintiff may have judgment as prayed
based on the pleadings and the statement of counsel." The defendants thereupon made an offer of
proof as follows:
"MR. SKEEN: Well, now, in order to make a record,
I would like to make an offerTHE COURT: Yes.
MR. SKEEN: -of proof.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. SKEEN: Comes now the defendants and offer
to prove by the testimony of Lyman Passey, who is
present in the courtroom, that the lease agreement
sued upon in this case was prepared by the sellers, the
plaintiffs; that Mr. Passey met with Mr. Ellison, one
of the plaintiffs, at the A.G. or the O.P. Skaggs office,
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and at that meeting a question was raised by Mr. Ellison as to the amount of the monthly payments for
the first twenty-nine months, and Mr. Ellison indicated that the figure he had in the draft of lease was
not sufficient to pay out the debt during the term of
the Robinson lease which is dated August 14, 1947.
Mr. Ellison with the approval of Mr. Passey thereupon changed the monthly figure by increasing it and
initialed it by the side of the agreement, and he stated
that with that change the lease agreement sued upon
would be paid out during the term of the Robinson
lease. Mr. Passey accepted Mr. Ellison's word as to
the computations because as obviously it was a verv
detailed and complicated mathematical problem t~
figure out the amortization and the amount that
would be paid on principal and interest each month
and finally arrived at the payment of the amount the
parties agreed to pay.
MR. SKEEN: Back on the record. Defendants will
-or offer to show by-also by the testimony of Mr.
Passey that-well, here it is-that the extra pay·
ments of a hundred dollars a month for twenty-nine
months were calculated by Lorin Ellison to adequately pick up the delinquent payments under a previous
contract dated February 16, 1952, between Famous
Foods and L. B. Johnson and Merrill M. Johnson. I
finally found that. I have it here." (R. 69, 71).

The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs
as prayed, together with interest and attorneys' fees.
The judgment is dated January 6, 1966, nunc pro
tune as of January 5, 1966. Findings of Fact and Con·
clusions of Law were signed and filed on January
24, 1966.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The judgment is not supported by Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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2. The court erred in denying a trial on the issues of mutual mistake and partial failure of consideration.

3. Parol evidence was admissible.

ARGUMENT
1. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW.

The rule that Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law must be filed before the entry of judgment
has long been established in Utah. Kahn vs. Central
Smelting Co., 2 Utah 371, reversed on another point,
102 U.S. 641, 26 Law. Ed. 266; Fisher vs. Emerson,
15 Utah 517, 50 P. 619; Billings vs. Parsons, 17 Utah
22, 53 P. 730.
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"In all actions tried on the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless the
same are waived, find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct
the entry of the appropriate judgement ... Findings
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on
decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other
motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b) ."

It is a matter of record that the case was before
the court for a trial on the issues; that an offer of
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proof was made by defendants and rejected; that no
waiver was made by defendants; and that no motion
was before the court.
It is also a matter of record that the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on the
24th day of January, 1966, 19 days after the judgment
became effective.
In addition it should be noted that what purport
to be Findings of Fact are, except for finding No. 2
concerning attorneys fees, in reality Conclusions of
Law.
It is apparent that the actions of the court pointed
out above are breaches of the Rules which constitute
reversible error.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING A TRIAL
ON THE ISSUES OF MUTUAL MISTAKE AND PARTIAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
The law is well settled that in case of a mutual
mistake of a material fact a written instrument wiil
be reformed by a court of equity to carry out the intentions of the parties.
The rule is stated by Williston as follows:
"'Vhere a written agreement is not in conformi.ty
with the actual intention of the parties in a material
matter, a court of equity will reform the writin? in a.ccordance with that intention if innocent parties will
not be affected thereby. The jurisdiction is confined
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to writings, but as to them it is clear." 5 Williston
on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Section 1547.

This rule has been adopted and followed in
Utah in several cases. Naisbitt vs. Hodges, 6 Utah
2d, 116, 307 P.2d 620 (1957); Sine vs. Harper, 118 Utah
415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950); Greene, Mistake in the Utah
Law of Contracts, 7 Utah Law Review 304 (1961).
In Sine vs. Harper, supra, a case in which a deed
was reformed for a mutual mistake, Mr. Justice Latimer explained the standard:
"That evidence be clear and convincing does not require that it be undisputed in all details. It would be
most unusual to have a trial on the merits where
witnesses did not disagree on some of the circumstances, on parts of conversations, and on some of
the facts. The test of clear and convincing is whether,
taking the evidence as a whole, it preponderates to
a convincing degree in favor of the plaintiffs. If it
does, then it meets the test ... "

In the present case the defendants offered to
prove by a witness in the courtroom that it was the
intention of both parties that the Lease Agreement
sued on would be paid out by the end of the term
of the Robinson Lease (R. 69, 71). This was obviously
a material part of the agreement, and, in fact, a primary inducement for the contract. The payments of
$545 per month for the first 29 months and the payments of $445 per month thereafter although net
broken down as between rent for the building and
Payment for the inventory and equipment, contained a large rent component. This fact is evident
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from a reading of the Robinson lease which required
the Lessees (plaintiffs) to construct thereon an O.P.
Skaggs system store with all costs of construction
of the building to be paid by the Lessees. The lease
provided further that Lessees would pay taxes to the
extent of $500 per year, and that upon the termination of the lease the building would be the property
of the Lessors. (R. 39-43).
Under the Lease Agreement between the parties hereto, Exhibit P-1, the defendants assumed the
obligations of the Robinson lease and took possession of the inventory and fixtures. The surrounding
circumstances indicate strongly that all parties intended that the rent and purchase price of the inventory and equipment would be paid out of the
operation of the grocery store.
The defendants made an offer of proof to show
a mutual mistake of fact (namely, the intention that
the Lease Agreement would be paid out upon the
termination of the Robinson lease). That the Robinson lease terminated about 11 months before the
pay-out on the Lease Agreement is evident from the
fact that when the defendants were evicted from
the premises unpaid installments at the rate of $445
per month amounted to $4778.35. During this period
of 11 months, the defendants would be required to
pay rent on a building from which they had been
evicted.
This point was argued to the trial court (R. 65)
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and was disposed of by the comment, "They have
got no help coming because they would have just
had to pay more each month." This was error because. in effect, it forced the defendants to continue
to pay rent on a building from which they had been
evicted. There was a partial failure of consideration.
The injustice is evident and the defendants were
entitled to a day in court and to equitable relief. A
question might well be raised as to what equitable
:-elief should be granted under the facts related
above. The cases hold that the circumstances of each
cc.se must be examined and justice should be done.
See Greene, "Mistake in the Utah Law of Contracts",
supra. One obvious item of relief should be the elimmation of the "rent component" from all payments
after the eviction from the premises.
We are aware that in a case involving mutual
mistake a court of equity considers the circumstances of each case and particularly such matters
as (1) negligence of the complaining party, and (2)
whether an innocent third party will suffer if equitable relief is granted. With respect to the first item
the monthly payments for a period of nine years
were to be applied, first, to accrued interest and,
second, to the principal. The mathematical computation of an amount to be paid each month to pay out
fae $39,650.92 during the period from November l,
1955, to February 14, 1963, is involved and complicated beyond the abilities of most people. Whether
'he defendants were justified in relying upon the
representations by the plaintiff, Lorin Ellison, tha:
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the pay-out and the termination of the Robinson
lease would occur at the same time is one of the
questions which should have been considered by
the trial court after hearing evidence. With respect
to item (2) it is apparent that no third party would be
adversely affected by the granting of equitable relief.
In any event, the defendants were entitled to
the benefit of the rule of Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge
Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561
(1960):
"A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admission and inferences which when viewed
in the light most favorable to the loser shows that
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.' Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."

See also Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants submit that there is more than a
"reasonable possibility" that they could produce evidence that would support a judgment in their favor.
3.

PAROL EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE.

The rejection of the defendants' offer of proof
(R. 69, 71) cannot be sustained on the theory that it
was not admissible under the parol evidence rule.
The use of parol evidence to prove the exist-
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ence of a mutual mistake of fact is well established
in Utah. In recognizing this, Mr. Justice Latimer for
the court in Sine vs. Harper, supra, said:
"Appellant is in error in her contention that testimony concerning the mistake was inadmissible because it varied the terms of a written contract. If
such a contention could be sustained, then the equitable theory of reformation of contracts would not
apply to written instruments. The right to reform is
given, at least in part, so as to make the written instrument express the bargain the parties previously
orally agreed upon. When a writing is reformed, the
result is that an oral agreement is by court decree
made legally effective although at variance with the
writings which the parties had agreed upon as a
memorial of their bargain. The principle itself modifies the parol evidence rule.
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5 Section 1552,
states the rule as follows:
'The right of reformation whenever allowed is necessarily an invasion of the parol evidence rule, since
when equity reforms a writing it enforces an oral
agreement at variance with the writing which the
parties had agreed upon as a memorial of their bargain. This limitation is necessary to work justice, and
there seems no more reason to object to it in case
of reformation than in case of recission for fraud or
mii:;take. In either case unless the mistake precludes
the existence of a contract at law, it should not be
denied that the writing correctly states the actual
contract or conveyance which has been made, but
since it is inequitable to allow the enforcement of it,
and since justice requires the substitution of another
in its place, equity gives relief where reformation is
appropriate, and to that end necessarily admits any
relevant parol evidence.' "
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CONCLUSION

The court erred in denying a trial of the material
issues of mutual mistake of fact and failure of consideration, and in entering a judgment without sup.
porting findings of fact and conclusions of law.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
must be reversed and the case remanded for a triai
on the equitable issues presented by the pleadings.

E. J. SKEEN
CRAIG G. ADAMSON

Attorneys for Appellants

